THE IMMUNITY OF CONGRESSIONAL SPEECH-ITS
ORIGIN, MEANING AND SCOPE
By LtON R. YANKWICHt
The Report of a sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, filed on July 20, 1950, denouncing
in unusually strong language the charges made by one of the Senators,
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin,1 called attention once more
to the constitutional immunity enjoyed by the members of the Senate
and House of Representatives. 2 The facts which led to the Report are
well known. In several public addresses and in a senatorial discussion
on foreign policy, Senator McCarthy had charged Owen Lattimore
with being "the chief architect" of the American foreign policy in
China and "the top Russian espionage agent in the United States",
and accused the State Department of harboring known Communists.
Owen Lattimore is a professor at Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland, and the director of its School of International
Relations. His wide knowledge and experience with Asiatic affairs
has made him an expert on Asiatic countries, especially China and the
lands between China and Russia. He is the author of several books
on those lands. As a writer and authority on the subject, he had acted
as consultant on various missions. As a political adviser to the Government of Chiang-Kai-Shek in 1941-1942, his recent views on the United
States Government's policy and attitude towards the Government of
China have been the subject of much discussion. After Senator
McCarthy's accusation was made, Lattimore and his friends took up
the challenge. As a result the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations appointed a sub-committee headed by Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, which, on July 20, 1950, made a
majority Report entirely exonerating Lattimore and denouncing the
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in legal periodicals.
1. SEN. REP. No. 2108, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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charges as unfounded. One of the minority, Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr., also stated in his generally dissenting special report that the
charges against Lattimore and the State Department had not been
proved.'
On the heels of the Report, in September, 1950, came another
senatorial attack. This time, Senator Andrew F. Schoeppel of Kansas
made serious charges against the loyalty of the Secretary of the Interior, Oscar C. Chapman. The quick disproval of the charges by
the Secretary and other sworn witnesses before the Senate Committee, headed by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming, and their
characterization of the accusations as lacking any foundation ended
the controversy very quickly.
Accusations of this character deserve the name applied to them
recently by a writer, "assassination [of character] by guesswork". 4
They unloose-to use the language of the protest of a small group of
Senators, headed by Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine-"the
four horsemen of calumny-fear, ignorance, bigotry, and smear." So
it is fitting to discuss the origin, nature and scope of the constitutional
immunity which attaches to the speech of members of the United
States House of Representatives and Senate.
HISTORICAL ORIGIN

Absolute freedom of speech for members of legislative assemblies
is one of the fundamentals of parliamentary government, accepted as
3. In his address on the floor of the Senate, in presenting the Report, Senator
Tydings summed up the result in Lattimore's case in these words:
"With reference to Lattimore, four members of the committee who saw fit
to file reports-the majority reports and the one by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Lodge)-say the charges are not proved." 96 Cong. Rec. 10867
(July 20, 1950). (Emphasis added)
4. Weeks, Atlantic Monthly, Sept., 1950, pp. 73, 74. In Christian Science
Monitor, September 14, 1950, p. 1, col. 3, under a Washington date line, Roland
Sawyer, speaking on "Congressional Privilege-and Its Abuse," and commenting on
the failure of the charges against Secretary Chapman and their relation to the charges
of Senator McCarthy against Owen Lattimore and the State Department, wrote:
"From the start of this case, the issue has been the use and misuse of senatorial privilege. The constitutional right of a senator or representative to speak
his mind on the Senate or House floor without fear of lawsuit -reached the
climax in the McCarthy case.
"Where Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R) of Wisconsin caused men to
fear prosecution without proof, the doubting Senator Schoeppel so far has provided almost comic relief. Unwittingly, he has provided something better. He
has given sensitive senators opportunity to review the value of privilege in a
calmer mood than was possible during the severe strain of the McCarthy in-

vestigation.
"Republicans as well as Democrats talked privately then about the misuse
of privilege, but seemed powerless to do anything. Not so this time. The moment
is not too soon to protect senatorial privilege which, properly used, can be a
valuable function. Even more, it is not too late to protect private citizens from
its unwarranted, sometimes unspeakably damaging, misuse."
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such by all governments which recognize the parliamentary system
and seek to insure its independence. The scope of this privilege was
stated by Thomas Jefferson in a petition addressed, in May, 1797, to
the Virginia House of Delegates, in which he took exception to the
presentment made by the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court at Richmond,
Virginia, which had criticized some members of Congress, including
one from Virginia, for disseminating what they called "unfounded
calumnies against the happy government of the United States." Jefferson wrote:
"that in order to give to the will of the people the influence
ought to have, and the information which may enable them
exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common law, adopted
the law of this land, that their representatives, in the discharge
their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion
the coordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive." 5

it
to
as
of
of

As Jefferson well stated, the immunity originated in England. It
developed as a privilege asserted by the Parliament of England against
the prerogatives of the King, in order to fulfill its function as an independent branch of Government. It came out of the struggle between
King and Parliament for supremacy. That is especially true of the
lower House of Parliament, because the House of Lords, in its inception, being considered "a court", enjoyed the right to speak freely on
governmental affairs without punishment by the King. But the assertion of this right by the Commons was challenged repeatedly by the
King, and only occasionally acknowledged. As is the case with other
incidences of constitutional history, many writers on the subject have
sought early precedents for the assertion of this right. Some refer
to a case dating back to Richard II (1396-1397). A member of the
Commons, Thomas Haxey, was condemned in Parliament as a traitor
for having offered a bill to reduce the expenditures of the royal household. The death sentence was not carried out during Richard's reign.
On the accession of his successor, Henry IV, Haxey petitioned" the
King in Parliament to reverse the judgment as being
"encountre droit et la course quel avoit este devant en Parlement"
(against the law and system which had existed before in Parliament).
The petition was granted in 1399. And, in the same year, the
Commons petitioned the King directly to reverse the judgment. This
was done. And the judgment was annulled.
5. LucE, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES
JFFERSON 158 (Ford ed. 1896).

516-518 (1924); 7
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A more significant case arose in the reign of Henry VIII (in
1512). Richard Strode, a member of Parliament, had been prosecuted
in the courts and imprisoned for having proposed bills to regulate the
Cornwall tin industry. Parliament passed an act annulling the judgment against him and declared void all suits and proceedings against
Strode and every other member of Parliament
"for any bill, speaking, or declaring of any matter concerning the
Parliament, to be communed and treated of, be utterly void and
of none effect." ' 6
But, notwithstanding this recognition, the right of free speech continued to be considered, more or less, as an act of grace on the part
of the King. For a long time, English courts could not agree whether
the Act of 1512 was general or special. And the real recognition of
the right to immunity for parliamentary speech or action came through
the request made by the Speaker of the House of Commons,-repeated
at the beginning of every session of Parliament,-which the King
granted, of the right to speak with impunity, along with other rights,
such as access to the King, and the like.
The first of these requests was made and granted in 1541. Under
the Tudor Kings, the royal prerogatives dominated, although strong
voices were heard asserting the right of the Commons during the absolute reign of Elizabeth. The struggle between the Stuart Kings
and Parliament, which brought on, first, the Commonwealth, then the
Restoration, and which culminated in what the English call "the
glorious Revolution" of 1688, led to the first unequivocal legislative
recognition in England of legislative immunity for parliamentary
speech.
An interesting prelude to this final acknowledgment occurred in
Parliament in December, 1641. Charles I had objected, on December
14, 1641, in his speech to Parliament, to the contents of a bill, stating
that he would not approve it if it came to him. The entire Parliament,
in its answer to the speech, asserted the right to be free of the domination of the King and to speak freely without incurring his displeasure:
"Amongst other the Priviledges of Parliament; They do,
with all dutiful reverence to your Most Excellent Majesty, declare
that it is their ancient and undoubted Right; 'That your Majesty
ought not to take notice of any matter in agitation and debated
in either of the Houses of Parliament, but by their information
6. MAY, PARLIAMENTARY PRACTiCE 47-52 (14th ed. 1946); 3 REDLICH, THE
PROCMURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 42 et seq. (Steinthal's transl. 1908);
WiTrKE, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 23-32 (1921); CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AmERICAN COLONIES 1-13 (1943).
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and agreement; and that your Majesty ought not to propound
any Condition, Provision, or Limitation, to any Bill, or Act, in
debate, or preparation, in either House of Parliament; or to Manifest, or declare, your consent, or dissent, approbation, or dislike
of the same, before it be presented to your Majesty in due course
of Parliament; and that every particular Member of either House
hath free libertie of speech to propound, or debate, in any matter
according to the order and course of Parliament; and that your
Majesty ought not to conceive displeasure against any man for
such opinions and propositions as shall be delivered in such
debate, it belonging to the several Houses of Parliament respectively to judge and determine such errours and offences in words
or actions as shall be committed by any of their Members in the
handling, or debating, any matters depending.'
"They doe further declare, that all the Priviledges above
mentioned have been lately broken, to the great sorrow and
grievance of your most humble and faithful subjects, in that
Speech which Your Majestie made in Parliament, to both Houses,
upon Tuesday last the fourteenth of this present moneth of December, in that your Majesty did therein take notice of a Bill for
impressing of Souldiers being in agitation in the said Houses,
and not agreed-upon: and that your Majesty did therein offer
a Salvo Jure, or provisional Clause, to be added to that Bill before
it was presented to your Majesty by the consent of both Houses,
and did at the same time declare your displeasure against such
persons as had moved some doubt, or question, concerning the
same Bill. All which they doe affirm and declare to be against
the ancient, lawful, and undoubted Priviledges and Liberties of
7

Parliament."

The Bill of Rights, granted by William and Mary in 1688, in
Section 19, gave ultimate recognition to the right in these words:
"That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in
Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court
or place out of Parliament."
And, subject to the extensions and limitations to be noted later in the
discussion, this is the form in which the right exists today.
THE DIFFUSION OF THE PRINCIPLE
Just as all parliamentary institutions find their inspiration in
English Parliament, so is this immunity of members of legislative bodies
7. MAY, HisTORY

OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND

234-235 (1812).

Before

the enactment of the Bill of Rights, on December 11, 1667, a Report of the Conference
of the Parliament on the effect of the statute of 1512 stated:
"An act of parliament cannot disturb the state; therefore the debate that
tends to it cannot, for it must be propounded and debated, before it can be
enacted."
3 RDCLic, op. cit. supra note 6, at 48.
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for what they speak in the legislative halls traceable to English precedent. Modem constitutional governments, wherever established, perceived, early in their development, the value of this principle. In
France, parliamentary immunity was introduced by resolution adopted
by the National Assembly in 1789 and reasserted in subsequent constitutions. Other continental European countries followed the French
pattern. The privilege was granted by the Belgian Constitution in
1839, by the Prussian Constitution of 1850, and the Constitution of
the German Empire (the First Reich) of 1871. Indeed, the general
liberal movement which dominated Europe in 1848 spread parliamentary and democratic ideals to many countries, European and
American, which adopted this immunity along with other liberal,
democratic principles. The First World War aided the adoption of
this principle in the liberal constitutions which, everywhere, except
in Soviet Russia, followed in its wake. Provisions embodying it are
found in the German Republican (Weimar) Constitution of 1919
(Article 36) ; 8 the Austrian Constitution of 1920 (Article 57), which
applies to local Diets also (Article 96) ; the Constitution of Greece
of 1927; 10 the Constitution of Ireland of 1921; " the Constitution of
Roumania of 1923 (Article 54) ; 1 the Constitution of Czechoslovakia
of 1928 (Article 23) : 13 and the Constitution of Turkey of 1924 (Article 17)14 and others.
In colonial America, the right was recognized in the various
Houses of Burgesses or Assemblies.15 This was in the spirit of the
attitude of the colonists who consistently claimed for themselves, as
individuals and for their instrumentalities of government, the rights
belonging to all Englishmen. And when the Federal Constitution came
to be written, it was to be expected that it would give recognition to
legislative immunity. This was done by providing that
for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [the
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any
other Place." 16

All the state constitutions, adopted after the establishment of independence, affirmed this principle. Later, the more modern constitu8. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH, LES CONSTITUTIONS DE L'EuRoPE NoUVELLE (1928).
9. Id. at 140 (Federal), 149 (Diets).
10. Id. at 202.
11. Id. at 224.
12. Id. at 285.
13. Id. at 329.
14. Id. at 352.
15. CLARxE, op. cit. mtpra note 6, at 61 et seq.
16. See note 2 mpra; 1 CoOLEY, ToRTs § 154 (4th ed. 1932), asserts that "[the
protection] exists independent of such a declaration as a necessary principle in free
government."
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tions reaffirmed it. Typical of the broad scope which the immunity
took is Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of
Massachusetts of 1780:
"The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either
house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people,
that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution,
action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." "
And, generally, the right exists in every state in the Union, either by
constitution, legislative enactment, or as a part of the accepted common
law.' 8
THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF THE IMMUNITY

It is plain that the immunity began as a protection against executive interference with the individual legislator. It broadened so as to
become an absolute shield against all outside interference with the
legislative process itself. And this, not so much as a protection to the
legislator as an essential condition for the existence and full development of the legislative process. Significantly, the Massachusetts Constitution considered fredom for legislative deliberation, speech and
debate "essential to the rights of the people." "9 Rightly. For, under
a democratic regime, legislation is-theoretically at least-the expression of the public will and the means of expressing that will in laws,
which the people, by the very nature of democratic assent, are bound
to obey. By keeping the legislator free from outside domination, executive or other, by eliminating the threat of interference through
prosecution, civil or criminal, the independent exercise of the rights
of the people, through legislation, is safe-guarded. With the development of the law of defamation, it was natural that, either by legislation
or judicial construction, what had begun as a defensive measure against
executive interference should extend to all attempts to curtail freedom
of legislation by court action. As a result the privilege became absolute,
conditioned only by the fact that what is said or spoken be done in
the course of legislative proceedings.
Some early cases in England sought to delimit strictly the scope
of parliamentary debate and action. One famous English decision
declined to extend the parliamentary privilege to private publication of
the debates."0 But at the present time, both in England and in the
17. MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI.
18. See CAL. Civ. CODE, § 47 (1941) ; Kelly v. Daro, 47 Cal.App.2d 418, 118 P.2d
37 (1941).
19. See note 17 mipra.
20. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (1839). It required
an act of Parliament to overcome the effect of this decision: 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9
(1840).
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United States, the privilege is absolute. It extends not only to the
debates themselves, but also to reports of the debates, to actions before
committees of legislative bodies, to petitions addressed to the legislative bodies or to any of their committees, and to witnesses appearing
or testifying before such committees.
A late English authority sums up the state of the law in England
in this manner:
"The absolute privilege of statements made in debate is no
longer contested, but it may be observed that the privilege which
formerly protected Members against action by the Crown now
serves largely as protection against prosecution by individuals or
corporate bodies. Subject to the rules of order in debate (see
Chap. XV] II), a Member may state whatever he thinks fit in
debate, however offensive it may be to the feelings, or injurious
to the character, of individuals; and he is protected by his privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any other question
or molestation." 21
This is also the present rule in the United States.2 2
In studying the evolution of the principle and reasons which the
courts have given for the protecting of the privilege, it is quite apparent
that courts were not so much interested in condemning calumny as in
protecting the freedom to legislate, which they deemed essential-in
the language of the Massachusetts Constitution-"to the rights of the
people". Lord Chief Justice Denman, in the case already referred to,2 3
while limiting the application of the immunity to outside publications,
nevertheless conceded its full application to whatever is essential to
legislation:
"Thus the privilege of having their debates unquestioned,
though denied when the members began to speak their minds freely
in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and punished in its exercise both
by that princess and her two successors, was soon clearly perceived
to be indispensable and universally acknowledged. By consequence, whatever is done within the walls of either assembly must
pass without question in any other place. For speeches made in
Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, or
hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete immunity. For any paper signed by the Speaker by order of the
House, though to the last degree calumnious, or even if it brought
21. MAY, PARLIAMENTARY PRAcTicE 51 (14th ed. Campion 1946); see Dillon
v. Balfour, 20 L.R. Ir. 600 (1887) ; see GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 211-213 (3rd
ed. O'Sullivan 1938).
22. YANKWICH, IT's LIBEL OR CONTEMPT IF YOU PRINT IT 292 (1950); 33
AM. JuR., Libel and Slander, §§ 142-143; 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 105;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §590 (1938).
23. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 1, 113-114; 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 (1839).
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personal suffering upon individuals, the Speaker cannot be arraigned in a Court of Justice."
In an early Massachusetts case, the immunity was given the
broadest scope:
"These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecutions, civil or criminal. I therefore think that the article
ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design
of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an
opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report,
and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the article as securing to
every member exemption from prosecution, for every thing said
or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions
of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular
according to the rules of the house, or irregular and agaifist their
rules. I do not confine the member to his place in the house; and
I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled to this
privilege, when not within the walls of the representatives'
chamber." 2

This latitudinarian view was adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States in a leading case, in interpreting the federal constitutional provision:
"Mr. Justice Story (sect. 866 of his Commentaries on the
Constitution) says: 'The next great and vital privilege is the
freedom of speech and debate, without which all other privileges
would be comparatively unimportant or ineffectual. This privilege also is derived from the practice of the British Parliament,
and was in full exercise in our colonial legislation, and now belongs
to the legislation of every State in the Union as matter of constitutional right.'
It seems to us that the views expressed in the authorities we
have cited are sound and are applicable to this case. It would be
a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words
spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be
reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done
vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things
24. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
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generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it."

25

As in other cases of absolute privilege, neither malicious falsity
nor bad motive will destroy its character. 26 Some years ago an attempt
was made to break the privilege of a United States Senator in an action
for slander by alleging that he had uttered certain defamatory words
concerning the plaintiff.
"'in the chambers of the Senate of the United States . . . in

the course of a speech but not in the course of a debate on the
floor of the Senate . . . unofficially and not in the discharge of
his official duties as a Senator of the United States . . . of and

concerning a subject not then and there pertinent or relevant to
any matter under inquiry by the said Senate of the United States,
maliciously, wilfully, falsely and wrongfully .. .. "2 7
The Court ruled that, despite the allegation of lack of pertinency, the
words having been spoken in the course of a speech in the Senate, were
absolutely privileged, saying:
"Under the declaration the words forming the basis of the
plaintiff's action were uttered in the course of a speech in the
chamber of the Senate of the United States, and were absolutely
privileged and not subject to 'be questioned in any other place.'
The averment that these words were spoken 'unofficially and not
in the discharge of his official duties as a Senator' is a mere
conclusion and entirely qualified by the averment that they were
uttered in the course of a speech." 28
In the same case, the Court gave the following as its reason for placing
a liberal construction upon the constitutional provision:
"It is manifest that the framers of the Constitution were of
the view that it would best serve the interests of all the people if
25. Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). Although this case
was a contempt case, the legislative freedom of speech was used to support the
power of Congress to punish for contempt. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896) ; In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897) ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S.
263 (1929); Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938); United
States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d
49 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949). And
see the noted classic judgment of Lord Chief justice Ellenborough in Burdett v.
Abbott 14 East., 1, 131 et seq., 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 551 et seq., (1811). In harmony
with the same trend is the rule giving absolute immunity to declarations of those
exercising executive power: RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 591 (1938); Glass v. Ickes, 117
F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See Note, Scope of
Absolute Privilege of Executive Officer, 132 A.L.R. 1340 (1941).
26. YANKWICH, IT's LnEL OR CONTEMPT IF You PRINT IT 292-297, 368 (1950).
27. Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (Emphasis added).
28. Id. at 784.
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members of the House and Senate were permitted unlimitd freedom in speeches or debates. The provision to that end is, therefore, grounded on public policy, and should be liberally construed.
Presumably legislators will be restrained in the exercise of such
a privilege by the responsibilities of their office. Moreover, in
the event of their failure in that regard, they will be subject to
discipline by their colleagues. Article 1, Sec. 5." 29
Courts realize, in the words of Balthazar, that "slander lives upon
succession" and may ".

.

.

With foul intrusion enter in, And dwell

upon your grave when you are dead." " Nevertheless, in protecting
the right to legislate in a free society, courts disregard the occasional
injury to individual reputation. They consider, in this light, not only
this particular immunity, but the immunity of all governmental acts.
As said by Justice Prettyman in a recent contempt case:
"The question presented by these contentions must be viewed
in the light of the established rule of absolute immunity of governmental officials, Congressional and administrative, from liability
for damage done by their acts or speech, even though knowingly
false or wrong. The basis of so drastic and rigid a rule is the
overbalancing of the individual hurt by the public necessity for
untrammeled freedom of legislative and administrative activity,
within the respective powers of the legislature and the executive."

31

The constitutional protection of legislative speech is, therefore, complete. Nearly seventy years ago Lord Chief Justice Coleridge summed
it up in one sentence:
"'What is said or done within the walls of Parliamentcannot
be inquired into in a court of law." 32
IMMUNITY-FOR WHAT?

The preceding analysis of the development of the principle of
legislative immunity of speech and action indicates that it began as an
assertion of a privilege by Parliament against the King. As parliamentary institutions gained in influence, the right, originally granted
as a matter of grace by the King, achieved constitutional and statutory
sanction. In this manner, it became a part of the common law of the
American colonies, found its way into their legislative practices and
29. Ibid.
Act III, Scene 1.
31. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948); and see United
States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) ; compare the language of the supreme
court of Ohio in Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 580-590, 37 N.E.2d 584,
589-592 (1941); and see RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §584 (1938).
32. Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271, 275 (1884).
And see, Ex parte
Wason, L.R. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869) ; Ex parte Herbert, 1 K.B. 594 (1935).
30. SHAKESPEARE, COMfEDY OF ERRORS,
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was, finally, given full recognition by the federal and state constitutions. In truth, so far as the state governments are concerned, the
right would probably be recognized to exist even if distinct constitutional statutory authority were absent. 3 That its existence is an
integral and indispensable part of modem legislative procedure in a
free society cannot be questioned.
As a society becomes more complex, the legislative process-the
means through which social control is exercised-assumes greater
significance. While the form of its exercise and the instrumentalities
through which it acts may change, the need for social controls will
increase rather than diminish. Even totalitarian regimes dissociate
legislation, to some extent, from executive control, although representation in the legislative body may be on a different basis, and the party
ideology is all-dominating.3 4 For this reason protection of legislative
speech and action, when confined to its legitimate aims, is, even today,
and will continue to be, in the language of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, "essential to the rights of the people". Its abuse may
result in what one of its recent victims called, "ordeal by slander".3 5
But the fact that a power may be abused or used oppressively "evidences
no ground for denying the power". 36 So, to abolish the privilege-as
some have advocated-is not the remedy. It cannot be done constitutionally. Nor can strict legal limits be imposed. Moreover, in view
of the significance of the right in the exercise of representative power
in a free society, it should not be abolished or curtailed by law. But it
should not be allowed to become a shield for base slander.
Vilification by senators is not new. In 1863, Senator Willard
Saulsbury called President Lincoln "a weak and imbecile man". The
Vice-President ordered the sergeant-of-arms to take the Senator in
charge, when he continued to talk after being ordered to sit down.
But when, during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, Charles Sumner,
speaking of the President, said, "We have never before had a President
of the United States who was an enemy of his country," the presiding
officer of the Senate ruled that the Senator was not out of order, and the
Senate sustained him.
33. 1

STORY,

COMMENTARIES

ON

THE CONSTITUTION,

§ 866; (5th ed. 1891).

1 COOLEY TORTS, § 154 (4th ed. 1932). Both assert its existence as a constitutional
right traceable to colonial days.
34. U.S.S.R. CONST., Art. III-XLII; MrRINE-GuETZEVITCH, Op. Ctit. spra
note 8, at 267, 272. See SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 60-61, 196-197 (1945) ;
TOWSTER, POLITICAL POWER IN THE U.S.S.R 343 et seq. (1948); VYSHIN SKY, THE
LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE et seq. (1948).
35. See LATTmoRE, ORDEAL BY SLANDER

(1950) ;

LATTIORE,

201 Harpers 43, 79 (Aug. and Sept. 1950).
36. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).

105 N.J. Eq. 134, 150 Atl. 322 (1929) ; 8

WIGmoRE, EvmNcE,

What It Was Like,

See Ex parte Hague,

§ 2195 (3d ed. 1940).
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In May, 1879, Senator Zachariah Chandler, speaking of twelve
senators, said: "By fraud and violence you occupy your seats." This
language was held not to impute fraud or violence to the senators themselves.37 And, more recently, in 1950, when the confirmation of
General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense came before the
Senate, Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana called Marshall, "front
man for traitors .

.

. a living lie .

.

. an unsuspecting stooge

• or an actual co-conspirator." The New York Times of September 17, 1950, commented, "The speech so shocked the Senate that
most decided not to 'dignify' it with a reply." Once more the Senate
showed its hesitancy to control senatorial speech. On the whole, the
Congress of the United States has not been consistent in censuring its
members for calumniating language, even when addressed to members
themselves. And it seems to have exercised little or no control over
attacks by its members on outsiders. The right of the Congress to
regulate and control the exercise of this privilege is implicit in the
constitutional provision that, for speech or debate, the members shall
not be questioned "in any other place." " There is also the right to
punish a member for disorderly behavior and, by two-thirds vote, to
expel him.3" On the other hand the English Parliament has been
very strict in censuring and expelling members for unwarranted vilification in debate. It has also imposed the most abject forms of
penance. 4' But, while we have instances of expulsion from the Senate
they involved members guilty of serious misconduct.
In July, 1797, Senator William Blount was expelled from the
Senate for "a high misdemeanor, entirely inconsistent with his public
trust and duty as a senator." The offense consisted of attempting to
induce an American Agent among the Indians to disregard his duties.
In commenting on the case, the Supreme Court notes:
"It was not a statutable offence nor was it committed in his
official character, nor was it committed during the session of
Congress, nor at the seat of government." 41
37. LucE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 511-512.
38. U.S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
39. Id., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 161, 169 (1897) ; Ki1bourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 182 (1880). For the right of expulsion in colonial
legislatures, see CLARKEa, op. cit. supra note 6, at 187-196; see references in notes
41 and 42 infra.
40. MAY, PARLIAMENTARY PRAcTicE 52, 60-64, 440-441 (14th ed., Campion,
1946) ; WiTTKE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 30; REDLcH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 7175; LucE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 275-292.

41. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897). The Blount case is reported in
929 (1903). A move to oust Senator John Smith
of Ohio for his alleged participation in the conspiracy of Aaron Burr failed on
April 8, 1808. The vote was 19 for and 10 against depriving the Senator of his
seat. He resigned on April 9, 1808. Id. at 934-948. This case is interesting for the
TArT, SENATE ELEcTioN CASES,
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Senators from the Confederate states who withdrew from the United
States Senate at the beginning of the War Between the States were also
expelled. 2 And in the House, many members voted, in October, 1921,
to expel Representative Thomas L. Blanton of Texas for inserting
scurrilous matter into the congressional record under leave to extend
his remarks. But a sufficient number of votes not having been secured,
he was reprimanded in a manner considered most humiliating.4"
The above analysis demonstrates forcibly what many victims of
Congressional vilification have learned through hard experience. The
American Congress is neither consistent nor effective in intra-parliamentary sanction of members who give expression to private spites.
What then shall the answer to the problem be?
PROPOSED REMEDIES

The Tydings Sub-Committee recognized the injustice and fraud
which, at times, the abuses of the immunity privilege made possible, and
recommended a congressional study with a view of preventing their
future recurrence. Its recommendation reads: "It is recommended that
a joint committee of the House and Senate be appointed to make a
careful study of the immunity from civil suit extended Members of
Congress by reason of statements made by them on the floor of either
House and before congressional committees. Our experience in this
investigation indicates that this privilege extended us should not
become a license for the character assassination of American citizens.
It is believed that from such a study it may be possible to evolve legislation which is designed to preserve this immunity without prejudice
to the historic and necessary reasons therefor and at the same time
insure that it does not become a shield to perpetrate injustice and
fraud." "
Senator Lester C. Hunt of Wyoming, a former governor of that
state, seems to be spearheading a movement in the Senate to deal
concretely with the abuses of congressional immunity. He has introduced a constitutional amendment which would abolish the immunity.
Aware, no doubt, of the objections which could be urged against the
reason that the committee of the Senate which recommended expulsion insisted that
the right to expel, as exercised previously in the Blount case, is not "a sequel to the
issue of a legal prosecution." Id. at 939. It would seem that, early in our history,
the Senate was inclined to consider the objectionable conduct of one of its members
a challenge to the Senate's own integrity. The language used by John Quincy
Adams for the Committee in the Smith case speaks eloquently for that view. See
LucE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 285-292.
42. TAFrr, op. cit. supra note 41, at 951-966.
43. LucE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 515-516.
44. SEN. REP. No. 2108, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1950).
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total abolition of the privilege, such as have been voiced in this article,
and of the slow process of achieving the result by amending the
United States Constitution, Senator Hunt has introduced a bill
which would give one defamed by any member of the Congress the
right to sue the Government. Senator Hunt would accomplish this
by amending the Federal Tort Claims Act. This Act, adopted by the
Congress on August 2, 1946, culminated a long struggle to secure
abandonment on the part of the Government of the United States of its
sovereign immunity to suit in tort cases. The Supreme Court characterized the Act as "the product of some twenty-eight years of congressional drafting and re-drafting, amendment and counter-amendment." 4
It allows actions to be brought
"for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 4
The Supreme Court has stated that the adoption of this Act and
of others which, in the past, have waived sovereign immunity to suit,
in special cases, "attests to the growing feeling of Congress that the
United States should put aside its sovereign armor in cases where
federal employees have tortiously caused personal injuries or property
damage." 7 And, in view of its avowed purpose and legislative history,
the Supreme Court has declined to apply to it the strict construction
which is usually applied to statutes surrendering governmental rights.
On the contrary, it has interpreted it as a broad consent to sue. 48 In
view of this attitude of the courts and of the liberal approach of the
particular statute by which Senator Hunt would give redress against
legislative defamation, no theoretical objection could be raised against
making the Government responsible for legislative slander. An employer is responsible for the slander by an employee, if committed in
the course of employment. The owner of a public place, such as a
saloon, is held responsible for an assault by an employee.49 Newspapers
are held accountable for the libelous statements of their reporters or
editors or others which they disseminate.
45. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1949).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346b. See Yankwich, Problemn Under the Federal Tort Claimns
Act, 9 F.R.D. 143 (1949); Tooze, Uncle Sam--Tort-Feasor, 29 ORE. L. REv. 245,

(1950).

47. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 453 (1947).
48. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949).
49. Novick v. Gouldsberry, 173 F. 2d 496 (9th Cir. 1949).
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In a strict sense, the relationship of a legislator to the Government
is not that of employer and employee. But, in a broader sense, the
members of the Senate and House are our agents. And, in view of
the trend expressed by the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the English Crown Proceedings Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1948,"0 there is as much reason for holding the Government
(us all) responsible for the reckless slander of an innocent person by
our legislative agents as there is for holding the Government (us all)
responsible for the reckless driving of a postal employee. The wrong
committed in both instances is a tort. It may be argued that we
employ legislators to legislate, not to vilify. But so do we employ
truck drivers to transport mail and other governinental property, not
to inflict physical injury on others. Once we postulate the advisability
of abandoning the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which in the United
States has been considered as an anachronism, 5 its extension to the
grievous tort of presently protected slander is but a slight step in enforcing responsibility in Government, and giving redress against irresponsible exercise of governmental power or immunity.
The proposal may seem drastic. But Senator Hunt, evidently
realizes that the abuses of legislative immunity endanger the free circulation of ideas by those who may be cowed by threats of untrammelled
and privileged denunciation by an authoritarian legislator and interests
who may be hiding behind him, determined to silence dissent.
Senator Hunt seems to think that the evil proportions which the
abuse of the privilege has assumed, warrant drastic action. For he
is quoted in the press as saying:
"If situations should confront us, when we . . . are no
longer able to control our own members by the rules of society,
justice, and fair play, then we must take drastic steps to control
them." 52
This view commands respect and assent. The proposed legislation
may not deter reckless legislators any more than the present tort claims
act may deter reckless drivers. But laws have a way of establishing
patterns of behavior. And recognition of liability may result in deterring abuses. Decency of conduct may become the proper thing, even
for a legislator. And, as in the case of personal injuries, vindication
through court action may bring some recompense to the injured person.
The Government, when sued, would be entitled to claim the qualified
50. 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44 (1947).
51. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924);
Borchard, Government Responsibility it Tort, 36 YALE LJ. 1, 3 (1926).
52. 172 Nation 4 (1951).
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privilege and the right to fair comment, which newspapers and others
have when dealing with comments on public men and public matters. 8
Our Congress has not shown the inclination to correct the abuses
of legislative immunity which the English Parliament has. And it is
doubtful if, having neglected to use the power of discipline to correct
the abuses, they will be ready to adopt so drastic a reform of their
own ways. However, the very agitation for such a bill is a helpful
sign and may be the way for abandoning, under the whip of public
opinion, what Senator Hunt called "such high-handed and irresponsible actions."
But self-discipline exercised by the Senate itself would, in the
last analysis, result in a more effective vindication of the person innocently accused than could be achieved by a money judgment. More,
it would help establish a healthier pattern in these debates which would
be beneficial to the legislative immunity itself, by retaining admitted
historical values, while doing away with some of its excrescences. It
would, in the words of the Tydings Sub-Committee:
"preserve this immunity without prejudice to the historic and
necessary reasons therefor and at the same time insure that it
does not become a shield to perpetrate injustice and fraud." 54
If the democratic way of life is to be maintained, it is our dutyto use the words of Bishop Francis J. McConnell-to maintain "a social
atmosphere in which the man whom we call the prophet gets his chance
to win a hearing." " And he cannot have this chance if irresponsible
legislators can, without fear of consequences, destroy him with calumny.
THE PUBLIC'S RESPONSIBILITY

So our final hope is an enlightened, vigilant and aroused public
opinion which will refuse to accept "guilt by mere accusation" in lieu
of proof under the due process of the Anglo-American legal system,
will actively aid those wrongfully accused, and will express its disapproval of abuse by legislators of this valuable privilege. For, free
as it is now of all legal restraint, if it is allowed to go unchecked by due
regard for the decencies of civilized behavior, it will help undermine the
legislative process itself.
53. See YANxKWiCH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 297, 323-329; Noel, Defamation of
Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoL. L. REV. 875 (1949); Yankwich, The Protection of Newspaper Comment on Public Men and Public Matters, 11 LA. L. Rtv. 327
(1951).
54. See note 44 supra.
55. Quoted in Yankwich, Freedom of the Press in Prospect and Retrospect, 15
So. CAL. L. REv. 322, 333 (1942).
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Totalitarian detractors-Fascist and Communist-may sneer at
parliamentarianism. But to those of us who believe that its disappearance would mean a loss of desirable values which have made life under
freedom richer and better, an impairment of the independent power
to legislate by loss of confidence in it would constitute an undesirable
weakening of the democratic ideal. This ideal and the values inherent
in it are constantly under challenge from without by undemocratic and
authoritarian power.
We should not tolerate their erosion by those acting under it, from
within. Abuse and distortion of legislative immunity by foul, backwounding and unlimited calumny, if not remedied, may result in an
erosion difficult, if not impossible, to reclaim. The risk should not be
incurred for the sake of allowing irresponsible legislators to vilify and
scourge with impunity.

